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Causal Effects of Paternity Leave 





In this paper we use a parental leave reform directed towards fathers to identify the causal 
effects of paternity leave on children’s and parents’ outcomes. We document that paternity 
leave causes fathers to become more important for children’s cognitive skills. School 
performance at age 16 increases for children whose father is relatively higher educated than 
the mother. We find no evidence that fathers’ earnings and work hours are affected by 
paternity leave. Contrary to expectation, mothers’ labor market outcomes are adversely 
affected by paternity leave. Our findings do therefore not suggest that paternity leave shifts 
the gender balance at home in a way that increases mothers’ time and/or effort spent at market 
work. 
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Paternity leave is often discussed as a policy measure to encourage greater gender equality
both in the family and in the labor market. Politicians and policymakers in Northern
Europe are strong believers that paternity leave strengthens women's position in the labor
market, reduce the gender wage gap and give children a chance to bond with their fathers
- and vice versa.1
Wishing to alter the traditional household specialization, politicians like to provide
incentives to increase men's involvement in the home. Even a few weeks of paternity
leave, the argument goes, may result in substantial changes.2 Thus recently Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden have all reserved a share of the parental leave for fathers.
Similar proposals are also popular and highly debated in other European countries.
In this paper we challenge the popular view. Our paper investigates how paternity
leave impacts a broad range of outcomes, using Norwegian register data. To handle
the selection problem we use the introduction of the paternal quota in Norway on April
1, 1993, to evaluate the causal eects of paternity leave on children and parents. We
nd that children's school performance benets from paternity leave in families where
the father is relatively higher educated than the mother. Consistent with this nding,
fathers' earnings and working hours seem to be negatively aected by paternity leave,
but the eects are not statistically signicant. Contrary to expectation, there are strong
and statistically signicant negative eects on women's labor market outcomes of their
spouse taking paternity leave. Furthermore, paternity leave has no signicant eect on a
set of family outcomes such as fertility and divorce rates.
Time allocation data from the United States show that fathers of sons spend more time
with their children than fathers of daughters (see survey by Lundberg (2005)). Fathers
1These views are articulated in a series of white papers, cp. `Likestilling for Likelnn' (Stortingsmeld-
ing nr. 6 (2010-2011)) and `Reformerad F or aldraf ors akring - K arlek, Omv ardnad, Trygghet' (SOU
2005:73).
2\To strengthen the father's role in his child's life, it is important for him to participate in childcare
during the child's rst year. A portion of the parental leave period should therefore be reserved for the
father". (The Norwegian Government's Long term program for 1990-1993 (Stortingsmelding nr. 4), our
translation.)
2of sons are also found to be more involved in school work than fathers of daughters
(Morgan et al. (1988)). In Scandinavia, however, fertility decisions indicate a preference
for daughters rather than sons (Andersson et al. (2006)). Furthermore, several studies
(surveyed in (Almond and Currie, 2010)) indicate that interventions can have dierent
long-term eects on boys and girls. For instance, girls seem to be more responsive to
preschool interventions (Cascio (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2011)).
Accordingly, one should expect the eects of fathers spending more time with their
children to dier according to the child's gender. Indeed, our estimated eect on school
performance is driven by an eect on girls' outcomes. For boys the estimates are smaller
and statistically insignicant. The dierence persists for the other outcomes as well: The
fathers and mothers that work and earn less due to paternity leave are the ones that get
daughters. The estimated impacts on family outcomes consistently have opposite signs
in families who had girls and in families who had boys.
While several papers have investigated how maternity leave (or general parental leave)
impacts parent (e.g. Lalive and Zweim uller (2009)) and child outcomes (see Baker and
Milligan (2011) for a review), there are few studies that have considered the particular
eects of paternity leave. Using paternal quota reforms in Sweden, Ekberg et al. (2005)
nd no evidence that paternity leave aects the extent to which fathers care for children
when they are sick, whereas Johansson (2010) nds no causal eect on mothers' and
fathers' earnings. However, the precision in the estimates of both of these studies is very
low. Using Norwegian data, Rege and Solli (2010) nd a negative eect of paternity leave
on fathers' earnings. We are not aware of any previous studies of how children's outcomes
are aected by paternity leave.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional
setting and the reform. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy. In Section 4 we
describe our data and the various outcome measures that we use. In Section 5 we present
the results. Section 6 concludes.
32 Paternity leave in Norway
In Norway, wage compensated parental leave has been extended continually since the
1970s, from 18 weeks leave with full wage compensation in 1977 to 46 weeks in 2009.3
Although the parental leave scheme oers full (or 80%) wage compensation, eligibility
for wage compensated leave is contingent on the mother having worked 50% or more
during at least six out of the last ten months before the child's birth.4 This applies to
both parents: Norwegian fathers have no independent right to paid parental leave. If
the mother works part time (between 50 and 100%), the father's compensation rate is
reduced accordingly. In addition, the father must himself have worked at least six out of
the last ten months in order to be eligible for wage compensated leave.5
Historically, men have taken very little of the leave period that can be freely shared
between the parents.6 This fact was debated in Norway during the 1980's, and various
measures that would induce men to take part of the leave were called for. In the autumn
of 1992, the labor party government included in their suggestion for the national budget
of 1993 a seven-week extension of the (100%) compensated parental leave period, of which
four weeks would be reserved for fathers.
The reform was passed in parliament in December 1992. Following implementation
on April 1, 1993, four of the 42 weeks of paid leave were reserved for the child's father.
Except under special circumstances, families would lose the right to these four weeks
unless taken by the father. In addition, the mother had to resume work for the father to
be eligible for the paternal quota.7 All subsequent extensions of the parental leave period
3See Appendix Table 15 for a full description.
4Sick leave from employment, unemployment with right to benets, and paid parental leave all count
as work.
5Income compensation also reaches an upper bound of six times the basic amount (G) (\Folketrygdens
grunnbelp") of the Norwegian social security system. This amount is adjusted yearly (or more often)
in accordance with changes in the general income level. From January 1 2010, G is NOK 72 881
(apprioximately USD 12 500). Until 2008, when self-employed were granted rights to full compensation,
the compensation rate for self-employed was at 65% of their income.
6The parental leave period can be shared between the mother and father, except for the rst six weeks
after birth, which have been reserved for the mother. In 1991, women were obliged to start their leave
period two weeks before expected delivery. From 1993 this is extended to three weeks.
7This requirement was relaxed in July 1994 (Brandth and verli (1998))
4Figure 1: Share of fathers taking leave in families eligible for parental leave, 1992-2005.
have been put into the paternal quota.
As is evident from Figure 1, the 1993 reform dramatically increased the number of
fathers taking paternity leave. In our sample of families eligible for parental leave, the
fraction taking paternity leave immediately increased from 4% in March 1993 to 39% in
April 1993. The fraction has increased steadily over time, to above 80% of eligible fathers
in 2005.
Figure 2 gives the distribution of paternity leave spells in our sample of fathers of
children born in a 26 week period surrounding April 1, 1993, in families who are eligible
for parental leave. The 40% percent of the fathers eligible for the paternal quota take
on average about 25 days of leave (ve weeks), with almost three quarters taking exactly
the four weeks of the quota.8 Most fathers only have one spell of paternity leave - if any
(90%). On average, their leave period starts when the child is nine months old. Less
8Only 10% of leave-taking fathers took more leave than the paternal quota until 1999. The fraction
rose to to 18% in 2004.
5Figure 2: Fraction of eligible fathers by number of leave days taken (working days).
Note: The sample is fathers of children born in a 26 week period surrounding April 1, 1993, who were
eligible for parental leave. A small number of fathers have very many leave days, for ease of exposure
the number of leave days have been truncated at 100.
than 5% take leave after the child has turned one year.
3 Identication
Estimating the causal eects of paternity leave on parent, family and child outcomes
is complicated by a selection problem. In families where fathers take parental leave,
both parents tend to be older, more educated and have higher income than in families
where fathers do not take parental leave. These families are also likely to dier along
unobservable characteristics as well. We handle the selection problem by exploiting the
introduction of the paternal quota at April 1, 1993.
63.1 Reform as exogenous variation
Our empirical strategy is based on the idea that when looking at births closely surrounding
April 1, 1993, the paternal quota reform provides quasi-experimental variation in the
uptake of paternity leave, since only families with children born after April 1, 1993 are
eligible for the paternal quota.
As mentioned in Section 2, not all of these families were actually covered by the
reform: Parents must be eligible for wage compensated parental leave for the reform to
represent an actual change in incentives. Therefore, in all of our analyses, our samples
are restricted to eligible families. How eligibility status is dened and determined will be
discussed in Section 3.4.
To eliminate inherent dierences between families with children born at dierent times
of the year9, we rely on a dierence-in-dierences approach, comparing the dierence be-
tween the 1993 pre-reform and post-reform cohorts in 1993 to that between corresponding
cohorts from 1992.
Families of children born during the same calendar month in the previous year con-
stitute a natural comparison group. Using 1992 as our comparison year is particularly
useful to us, as there was a reform extending general parental leave rights by three weeks
on April 1, 1992. As mentioned in Section 2, the 1993 reform was not a clean paternal
quota reform: For parents of children born after April 1, the compensated parental leave
period was extended by a total of seven weeks, and, from this date on, four (of the now
42) weeks of parental leave were reserved for fathers. Since our interest in the 1993 reform
lies with the impact of only the paternal quota, we use the 1992 reform to remove the
9The children in our post-reform cohort will of course on average be somewhat younger than those
in our pre-reform cohort. This may matter for the child outcomes we consider, as several studies have
documented an association between season of birth and school performance (e.g. Strm (2004) provides
evidence for Norway). It is widely believed that this relationship is caused by dierences in age at school
entry, but it may also simply re
ect that children born at dierent times of the year are conceived by
women with dierent socioeconomic characteristics (Buckles and Hungerman (2008)). This age dierence
may also matter for some of the parental outcomes, as they are generally measured annually. Because
mothers of children born before the reform, all else equal, will have a higher probability of a full year's
income even several years later, one might spuriously attribute to the reform what is in reality a mere
child age eect.
7eect of the increase in general parental leave typically taken by the mother.10
We thus have four groups of parents: The 1992 pre- and post-reform cohorts, and the
1993 pre- and post-reform cohorts. Their respective parental leave rights are given in
Table 1.
Table 1: Parental leave scheme in Norway 1992-1993
Before April 1 After April 1 Dierence
1992 32w, 0w pat. quota 35w, 0w pat. quota 3w gen. leave
1993 35w, 0w pat. quota 38w, 4w pat. quota 3w gen. leave + 4w pat. quota
3.2 Strategic timing of births
The 1993 reform was a large reform in the history of the Norwegian parental leave scheme.
With the exception of the 1977 reform, all previous parental leave reforms meant an
extension of four weeks or less. Seven weeks leave with full wage compensation is a
considerable benet at a time when childcare slots were rationed and many parents went
on unpaid leave to care for small children. The 1993 reform therefore provided parents
with strong incentives to have children born after April 1 rather than just before.
We see little reason to suspect that parents could time conception in anticipation of the
reform. The national budget where the paternal quota was introduced became publicly
available at October 7, 1992. At this time mothers who gave birth close to April 1, 1993
were already pregnant. Admittedly the reform itself was probably not very surprising to
followers of the policy debate in Norway at the time, but there is little reason to expect
that future parents knew the exact date of its implementation.11 Searches in newspaper
archives also suggest that the date of implementation was not publicly available before
the national budget was presented.
Even if conception was not timed strategically, expecting parents with due dates close
10The 1992 reform was also announced during the autumn prior to its implementation; accordingly,
there is little reason to fear that parents anticipated it and planned conception in order to t the reform.
11Of the previous 7 parental leave reforms in Norway, implementation dates varied between April 1
(in 1989 and 1992), May 1 (in 1987 and 1990) and July 1 (in 1977, 1988 and 1991).
8Table 2: Birth rate eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 1 week  2 weeks  3 weeks  4 weeks
Panel A: Dependent variable is daily number of births
Reform 18.0** 19.5*** 9.00** 6.41*
(7.54) (5.39) (4.39) (3.79)
cons 192.7*** 202.6*** 179.4*** 181.7***
(11.8) (9.71) (6.67) (5.94)
Number of births moved 63 136.5 94.5 89.7
Observations 406 812 1218 1624
R2 0.863 0.760 0.723 0.696
Panel B: Dependent variable is ln(daily number of births)
Reform 0.099** 0.11*** 0.051** 0.035
(0.043) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022)
cons 5.27*** 5.32*** 5.18*** 5.19***
(0.067) (0.055) (0.038) (0.034)
Share of births moved 5.1% 5.7% 2.6% 1.8%
Observations 406 812 1218 1624
R2 0.866 0.766 0.730 0.706
Note: Sample is daily births within the relevant window (always centered around April 1), for the years
1975-2005. \Reform" is a dummy taking the value 1 for days in April 1993.
to April 1 could possibly postpone induced births or planned cesarean sections. Although
the scope for strategic birth timing is limited since the vast majority of births in Norway
are spontaneous vaginal deliveries, we investigate this claim empirically.12 Following Gans
and Leigh (2009), we run a regression where we relate the daily number of births to the
reform (a dummy taking the value 1 for days after April 1 in 1993). We control for day
of year xed eects and for day of week xed eects interacted with year xed eects. In
addition we add dummies for 10 days during Easter.13 Our sample is daily births during
the relevant time window (surrounding April 1) for the period 1975-2005, excluding 1989
and 1992 when parental leave reforms were implemented on April 1.
The analysis shows that day of week eects are considerable. This indicates that
12In 1993 the fraction of children born by cesarean section was around 12.4 percent, and of these deliv-
eries, 59.4 percent were emergency operations. On average 12 percent of vaginal deliveries in 1993 were
induced, while 88 percent were spontaneous (Folkehelseinstituttet, http://mfr-nesstar.uib.no/mfr/
).
13In Norway, the Thursday and Friday before and Monday after Easter day are public holidays.
9there is scope for non-medical reasons to aect the time at which children are born. As
is reported in Table 2, we do nd statistically signicant evidence of strategic timing of
births. The reform seems to have increased the daily number of births by 19.5 on average
for the rst two weeks of April relative to the last two weeks of March. This estimate
implies that a total number of 137 births, or about 5.7% of the births predicted to have
occurred in the last two weeks of March, were moved from somewhere in the latter half of
March to somewhere in the rst half of April 1993.14 That the 1993 parental leave reform
seems to have induced some parents to strategically time births is also documented by
Brenn and Ytterstad (1997).
If strategic timing of births is related to (unobservable) characteristics that matter
for the outcomes that we consider, this will bias our estimates of paternity leave. We
address this potential problem by excluding births occurring during the two last weeks
of March and the two rst weeks of April.
3.3 Empirical specication
We estimate the following relationship based on data from families with children born in
1992 and 1993:
Yi = PaternityLeavei + Xi + WWeeki + Y1993i + i; (1)
where i is the child/household/parent indicator. Y denotes the parent, family or child
outcome of interest to be discussed in Section 4, and X is a vector of pre-birth controls.
Week is a vector of dummies indicating during which week of the year the child was born.
By including this vector we eliminate inherent dierences between families with children
born at dierent times of the year. 1993 is a dummy indicating whether the child was
born in 1993 or in 1992.  is the error term.  is the parameter of interest. For  to be
14Following Gans and Leigh (2009), the total number of births moved is calculated by dividing daily
number of births by two (as one birth moved means one birth less in March and one more in April) and
then multiplying by the number of days in the window. Similarly, the share of births moved is calculated
by dividing the coecient by two before converting log points to percentage points.
10Figure 3: Daily births residuals
Note: Daily births residuals for the eight weeks centered around April 1, 1993 from a regression on day
of year xed eects, day of week xed eects interacted with year xed eects, and dummies for 10 days
during Easter. Sample is based on data from daily births during eight-week time windows around April
1 for the period 1975-2005 (excluding 1989 and 1992).
given a causal interpretation we instrument PaternityLeave with whether the child was
born before or after the introduction of the paternal quota. The identifying assumption
is that - other than the four weeks of paternal quota - there are no dierences between
the 1993 pre- and post-reform cohorts that do not also appear between the 1992 pre- and
post-reform cohorts.
Our rst stage is given by:
PaternityLeavei = Reformi + Xi + 
WWeeki + 
Y1993i + i; (2)
where Reform is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the child was born after April
1, 1993.  is the regression adjusted compliance rate and  is the error term.
11Following Imbens and Angrist (1994),  is the local average treatment eect (LATE).
This is the average treatment eect for compliers: that is the families whose treatment
status (paternity leave) is aected by the paternal quota reform. An empirical description
of this group is given in Section 5.4.
3.4 Eligibility and sample criteria
As mentioned in Section 2, both parents' right to paid parental leave is contingent on the
child's mother having worked at least 50% during six out of the last ten months before
the child's birth. Hence, families where mothers did not work the required amount were
not covered by the paternal quota reform.
Since we do not perfectly observe eligibility status, we rely on parents' income history
to capture this. In order to be considered eligible, both parents need to have an income
above twice the `basic amount' of the Norwegian social security system the year before
the child was born (see footnote 5). 57% of all families fulll this criterion. As our income
criterion is rather strict, we may be excluding families that were actually eligible. With
the strict criterion we are fairly condent, however, that our sample consists of families
that were truly eligible for the paternal quota if they had children born after April 1,
1993. This is similar for the 1992 reform, as the rules for eligibility did not change with
either reform.15
3.5 Time window
We face a trade-o between low bias and high precision when choosing the time window
on which to estimate (1). In a narrow time window there is less chance that our main
estimates are contaminated by omitted variables. A broader window would provide more
precision by increasing the number of observations.
15Since information on both the 1992 and 1993 reforms became public in October of the previous year,
and we use income data from that calender year to capture eligibility status, parents may have some
scope to select into eligibility. In the data this does not seem to be a problem, all of our results are
basically unaltered if we lag the eligibility criteria one year.
12To balance these concerns we use a 13 week window as our baseline in all specica-
tions. We also report results on a 7 week window. In line with the discussion of parents'
strategic timing of births, we exclude observations from the two weeks before and the




Given their young age, there is limited register information on these children. We do
however have data on school performance from administrative registers. In Norway,
primary and lower secondary school (in total 10 years of schooling) are mandatory. At
the end of lower secondary school students are graded. These grades matter for admission
to upper secondary schools. Most grades are set by the student's own teachers; however,
every student is also required to take a written exam, which is anonymous and graded by
teachers from another school. To get an unbiased measure of student ability, e.g. avoid
problems with relative grading, we focus on these latter exam scores. The exam subject
is chosen randomly from the core subjects Norwegian, English and mathematics. Grades
take integer values from one to six. For ease of interpretation grades are standardized
and measured in units of standard deviations.16
The school performance sample is not identical to the samples for parental and family
outcomes. The main reason is that for some children we do not observe an exam score.17
The two samples are similar in terms of observables, both in terms of distribution and in
terms of change around the introduction of the paternal quota.
16Exam grades have a standard deviation close to one, such that this standardization has limited
impact, and the coecients are close to the estimated eects also in units of grade points.
17Almost all children who continue to live in Norway will end up in the lower secondary school data.
However, a small minority leave school early or late, these are excluded from our analysis, and about 4
percent of the students have no written exam score. In addition, families having multiple births will be
represented with more than one observation in the analysis of children's outcomes.
13Table 3: Summary statistics, labor market outcomes.
Mean SD
Fathers
- earnings, 2-5 294371.1 (124846.6)
- earnings, 6-9 343035.1 (164772.1)
- full time, 2-5 0.78 (0.34)
- full time, 6-9 0.79 (0.35)
- part time, 2-5 0.80 (0.33)
- part time, 6-9 0.80 (0.34)
Mothers
- earnings, 2-5 159553.8 (78809.2)
- earnings, 6-9 184908.3 (99916.3)
- full time, 2-5 0.41 (0.41)
- full time, 6-9 0.43 (0.42)
- part time, 2-5 0.57 (0.40)
- part time, 6-9 0.60 (0.40)
N 28344
Note: Sample is children born during the 26 weeks surrounding April 1, 1993, excluding two weeks before
and after April 1, divided into those born during the 13 weeks preceding the reform and those born during
the rst 13 weeks after the reform. 20 hours of work or more per week is classied as part-time, 30 hours
or more is classied as full-time. Earnings are given in constant 1998 NOK.
4.2 Labor market outcomes
Statistics Norway provides data on yearly income going back to 1967 for the entire Nor-
wegian population. Earnings are given in constant 1998 NOK, and are truncated above
the 99th percentile. Data on employment status are obtained from Statistics Norway
Employment register (\Arbeidstakerregisteret"), which contains data on all Norwegian
employees.18 This time series starts in 1993. Work hours are only reported in three
broad categories: 1-19 hours, 20-29 hours and 30 or more hours. To measure labor
supply we construct dummy variables capturing whether the individual work at least 20
hours (which we classify as part-time) or at least 30 hours (which we classify as full-time).
If an individual is not registered with any employment or is dened as self-employed19,
18This data set is used in several previous studies of the Norwegian labor market. Bratsberg and
Raaum (2010), for example, use this data set to analyze how immigrant employment aect wages in the
construction sector.
19If we observe that the individual has income from work that exceeds 1G, and in addition the in-
dividual's entrepreneurial income exceeds her income from employment, the individual is classied as
self-employed.
14his or her hours are set to zero.
To facilitate interpretation we rely on averages of labor market outcomes based on
earnings and labor supply for multiple years. Such aggregation is also useful since it
improves statistical power to detect eects that go in the same direction within a domain,
without increasing the probability of a Type I error (Kling et al. (2007), Deming (2009),
Almond and Currie (2010)). The averages are constructed by normalizing all outcome
variables to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one, and then averaging over
these outcomes.
Table 3 shows the variation in the labor market data based on averages from when
the child is 2-5 years old and 6-9 years old.20 For families with children born in 1993
(1992) `earnings 2-5' refer to average yearly earnings in the period 1995 through 1998
(1994 through 1997). We do not report results for earnings based on data from when
the child is one year old, since most parents will be taking part of their leave during this
year.
In our sample, 78% of fathers work full time, and an additional 2% work part time.
These numbers are constant across child ages. Mothers work less: When the child is 2-5
years old, 41% work full time, while an additional 15% work part time. The numbers
increase slightly at later child ages.
4.3 Family outcomes
Data on marriage, divorce and parity come from Statistics Norway's family and demogra-
phy les. We investigate the impact of paternity leave on the following family outcomes:
parents' total number of children 15 years after the reform (2008), their probability of
divorce, the probability that the father has his next child with the same woman (condi-
tional on having another child), child spacing and the number of days parent take leave
if they have another child. Table 4 provide descriptive statistics.
For the family outcomes we also construct an index. Following Deming (2009), we
20This is a natural division as compulsory schooling in Norway starts at age six.
15Table 4: Summary statistics, family outcomes.
Mean SD
Mother's parity 2.54 (0.85)
Father's parity 2.63 (0.96)
Prob(Divorced by child age 14) 0.21 (0.41)
Prob(Next child together) 0.87 (0.34)
Child spacing (years) 3.51 (1.80)
Father's leave next child (days) 24.8 (26.4)
N 17257
Note: Sample is children born during the 26 weeks surrounding April 1, 1993, excluding two weeks
before and after April 1, divided into those born during the 13 weeks preceding the reform and those
born during the rst 13 weeks after the reform.
decide whether an outcome is to be considered positive or negative and change the sign of
negative outcomes. Hence, completed fertility (measured as parity in 2008) for mothers
and fathers and the probability of the couple having their next child together enter
positively, whereas the probability that the couple is registered with divorce 14 years
later and the distance in time to their next child enter negatively.21
4.4 Control variables
We include control variables for parents' age at birth of their child and level of education
and annual income the year before birth. We also control for birth order. Education is
measured (October, 1) the year before birth, and is divided into four mutually exclusive
categories; lower secondary education or less, upper secondary education, higher educa-
tion lower degree and higher education higher degree. Birth order is controlled for by
dummies for the number of children each parent already has, with six categories ranging
from zero to ve or more.
Table 5 give descriptive statistics for pre-birth characteristics for eligible parents whose
children were born within a thirteen-week window prior or subsequent to April 1, 1993,
excluding two weeks before and after April 1.22 Columns (1) and (2) present averages
21Outcomes that, for obvious reasons, cannot be observed for a given family are excluded when gen-
erating the index.
22The characteristics are the same as those we control for in the regression. However, in Table 5 the
16and standard deviations for the pre- and post-reform groups. Column (3) reports the
estimated dierence, and a test of equality for the two groups. Finally, column (4) presents
a dierence-in-dierence estimate for each of the variables, comparing the dierences
between the pre- and post-reform groups with the corresponding dierences for children
born in 1992. Further descriptive statistics for the 1992 births are presented in Table 16
in the Appendix.23
The rst thing to notice is how the 1993 reform changed the fathers' leave-taking
behavior in our sample of eligible parents. Fathers' propensity to take parental leave
increased by 36 percentage points, and their average number of leave days taken increased
by 8 (meaning an average increase of 22.2 work days for those fathers actually taking leave
- slightly more than the 4 weeks of paternal quota). This is in stark contrast to the year
before. As the dierences and di-in-di estimates are very similar, there was very little
change in fathers' around April 1, 1992.
Also mothers' leave-taking behavior seem to have changed. Average leave days taken
increased by 25, i.e. ten days more than the general increase in the parental leave (the
increase not reserved for the paternal quota), and also about ten days more than the 1992
increase. This may be an indication that the paternal quota was enforced less strictly
than the legislators intended, and that - at least initially - a fairly large share of the
mothers got the paternal quota in addition to the rest of the leave. Furthermore, the
share of mothers taking leave also increases markedly, by about six percentage points.
Having not found any change in regulations explaining the change in the share of
mothers taking leave, this may be an artefact of changes in reporting practices that
coincide with the introduction of the paternal quota, but we can not be sure about this.
If the paternal quota was not taken by the fathers, but rather by the mothers, this could
be expected to reinforce rather than change traditional roles in the household. However,
while increasing paternal leave from zero to four weeks may produce a qualitative change,
categories for three, four and ve or more older children have been combined for ease of exposition.
23The descriptive statistics presented here are based on the school performance sample. Descriptive
statistics based on the sample of births are very similar.
17Table 5: Descriptive statistics for cohorts born before and after April 1, 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-reform Post-reform Dierence Di-in-di
Mean SD Mean SD Estimate SE Estimate SE
Fathers
- % take leave 3.87 (19.3) 40.3 (49.1) 36.4*** (0.62) 35.9*** (0.68)
- no. leave days 2.02 (12.7) 10.3 (19.7) 8.29*** (0.27) 7.65*** (0.33)
- % age < 25 4.15 (19.9) 4.66 (21.1) 0.51 (0.34) 0.53 (0.49)
- % age 25-29 27.6 (44.7) 28.5 (45.1) 0.90 (0.74) 1.08 (1.04)
- % age 30-34 36.0 (48.0) 37.4 (48.4) 1.39* (0.79) 0.34 (1.11)
- % age > 34 32.2 (46.7) 29.4 (45.6) -2.80*** (0.75) -1.94* (1.06)
- % lower sec. or less 37.1 (48.3) 36.7 (48.2) -0.46 (0.79) 0.34 (1.12)
- % upper secondary 34.8 (47.6) 34.4 (47.5) -0.39 (0.78) -1.56 (1.10)
- % higher ed.  4 yrs 19.3 (39.5) 20.2 (40.2) 0.96 (0.65) 1.30 (0.92)
- % higher ed. > 4 yrs 8.79 (28.3) 8.68 (28.2) -0.11 (0.46) -0.079 (0.66)
- annual income 259.1 (100.2) 257.7 (99.7) -1.36 (1.64) -2.84 (2.27)
- % has no children 40.1 (49.0) 38.5 (48.7) -1.55* (0.80) 0.85 (1.13)
- % has one child 38.0 (48.5) 39.3 (48.8) 1.28 (0.80) -0.50 (1.12)
- % has two children 16.1 (36.7) 16.8 (37.4) 0.74 (0.61) 0.40 (0.85)
- % has  three children 5.84 (23.5) 5.37 (22.5) -0.48 (0.38) -0.75 (0.53)
Mothers
- % take leave 90.4 (29.5) 96.2 (19.0) 5.87*** (0.40) 7.36*** (0.64)
- no. leave days 179.7 (67.9) 204.2 (68.5) 24.5*** (1.12) 10.2*** (1.54)
- % age < 25 11.9 (32.3) 12.5 (33.1) 0.62 (0.54) 0.36 (0.77)
- % age 25-29 38.6 (48.7) 40.4 (49.1) 1.73** (0.80) 1.99* (1.13)
- % age 30-34 33.1 (47.1) 32.7 (46.9) -0.41 (0.77) -1.40 (1.08)
- % age > 34 16.4 (37.0) 14.5 (35.2) -1.94*** (0.59) -0.95 (0.82)
- % lower sec. or less 38.3 (48.6) 36.1 (48.0) -2.16*** (0.79) -1.29 (1.12)
- % upper secondary 29.9 (45.8) 31.5 (46.4) 1.61** (0.75) 1.24 (1.06)
- % higher ed.  4 yrs 27.8 (44.8) 28.2 (45.0) 0.43 (0.74) 0.67 (1.04)
- % higher ed. > 4 yrs 4.03 (19.7) 4.14 (19.9) 0.11 (0.32) -0.61 (0.45)
- annual income 178.2 (58.6) 176.7 (58.6) -1.54 (0.96) -2.97** (1.34)
- % has no children 42.0 (49.4) 40.5 (49.1) -1.50* (0.81) 0.87 (1.14)
- % has one child 39.2 (48.8) 39.9 (49.0) 0.72 (0.80) -0.93 (1.13)
- % has two children 14.8 (35.6) 16.0 (36.7) 1.18** (0.59) 0.43 (0.83)
- % has  three children 4.01 (19.6) 3.61 (18.7) -0.40 (0.31) -0.37 (0.43)
N 7203 7752 14955 30116
Note: All observations except those regarding parental leave are taken from the year before the child's
birth. Age categories are based on parents' age at birth of the rst child. Sample is children born during
the 26 weeks surrounding April 1, 1993, excluding two weeks before and after April 1, divided into those
born during the 13 weeks preceding the reform and those born during the rst 13 weeks after the reform.
18the marginal eect of maternity leave, when it already is over 30 weeks, is likely to be
much smaller.
Other than parental leave, there are few statistically signicant dierences in the
pre-birth characteristics between the pre- and post-reform 1993 cohorts. Furthermore,
these are largely matched in the 1992 data, such that there is only one variable which
has a dierence-in-dierence signicant at he 5% level, and two more at the 10% level.
With 26 variables tested, this is about what we would expect if there were no systematic
dierences. Thus, on the whole Table 5 gives support to the idea of the reform providing
exogenous variation along the relevant dimension (and only this one): Parental leave.
5 Results
We now present our estimates of the causal eects of paternity leave, instrumented by
the Norwegian 1993 paternal quota reform. For brevity, we present only the LATE in
question ( in Equation 1). Tables including the coecients on covariates are available
upon request.
Our rst stage results (see Appendix Table 17) show that the excluded instrument
(Reform) is a strong predictor of paternity leave: The regression adjusted compliance
rate is 0.37 for our baseline specication.
Although the compliance rate is high and our instrument strong, 4 weeks of paternity
leave may not be considered enough time to really impact long run outcomes. In so far
as our point estimates point to zero eects, or no precise eects, this may not be taken
as proof that paternity leave does not at all have an impact on these outcomes; it may
also be that the reform is too small.
Yet, the perceived mechanism is not merely a direct link from 4 weeks spent at home
by fathers to a change in children's school performance 15 years later, or to a penalization
by employers for the time taken o from work. Rather, in line with Becker (1985, 1991)
and the stated intentions of Norwegian policy makers, the relatively short period of
19paternity leave is assumed to aect the evolution of household roles and labor sharing,
with a small change in initial comparative advantages yielding a larger impact on the
degree of specialization in the longer run.
For every outcome, we run four dierent specications. In Tables 6 through 11, column
(1) shows the results from regressions on equation (1) on a 13 week window (excluding
the 2 weeks that are aected by birth timing) without controls. In column (2) we have
added the full set of family background variables available. This is our most preferred
specication. Column (3) shows results when the time window is reduced to 7 weeks.
Lastly, in column (4) we have included the 2 weeks aected by birth timing in the 13
week window.
When results are discussed without explicit reference to one particular specication,
the specication in column (2) is the one in question.
5.1 Children's school performance
There is a rapidly growing literature on the importance of early childhood development
for long term outcomes. Cunha and Heckman (2007) argue that skill formation early in
life is determinant of skill development later on. Almond and Currie (2010), who have
recently reviewed the literature in this eld, state that child and family characteristics
measured at the age of ve "do as much to explain future outcomes as factors that
labor economists have more traditionally focused on, such as years of education". Using
Norwegian data, Carneiro et al. (2010) nd that maternity leave signicantly increases
the probability that the child nishes high school. It is therefore of great interest to see
how children are aected by paternity leave.
For the children born at the time of the 1993 paternal quota reform, there is naturally
still a limited set of variables available. To measure cognitive skills we rely on pupils
exam scores at the end of 10th grade (in 2009). 10th grade is the last year of mandatory
schooling in Norway.
Table 6 presents the regression results for exam scores at the end of 10th grade.
20Table 6: The impact of paternity leave on school performance at age 16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13 Weeks 3-13 Weeks 3-7 Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave 0.085 0.095* -0.020 0.067
(0.063) (0.058) (0.088) (0.053)
Observations 28797 28797 13613 34256
R2 0.005 0.173 0.172 0.173
Note: Each column provides results from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Paternity leave does not seem to have a robust eect on average school performance. For
our preferred specication (column (2)), there is a positive eect of paternity leave on
school performance close to 1/10 of a standard deviation, signicant at the ten percent
level. The result is similar (but not statistically signicant) when the birth timing weeks
are included (column (4)) and in the specication without controls (column (1)). When
we reduce the time window the eect is relatively imprecise and close to zero (specication
(3)).
Relative importance of parents
Using Swedish data, Liu and Skans (2010) nd that the duration of general parental leave
(typically taken by mothers) has no eect on average on children's school performance.
They do however nd positive eects for children of mothers with tertiary education,
suggesting that parental leave strengthens the relationship between maternal education
and school performance. This may also be relevant in our context.
However, the eects of maternal and paternal leave may be expected to dier. Mater-
nal leave will tend to make unpaid leave paid, or replace non-parental care (e.g. kinder-
gartens and grandparents) with maternal care. Maternal education may matter because
of dierences in change of behavior between high- and low-educated mothers and because
of dierences in the productivity of maternal time. This makes it relevant to study sepa-
rate eects by maternal education. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction
21Table 7: The impact of paternity leave on school performance at age 16: Interaction
eects with parental educational groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.33*** 0.26** 0.17 0.21**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.092)
- equal educ (F = M) 0.015 0.030 -0.13 0.0092
(0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10)
- mother highest educ (F < M) -0.080 -0.0014 -0.11 -0.019
(0.098) (0.089) (0.14) (0.083)
Observations 28797 28797 13613 34256
R2 0.003 0.173 0.171 0.173
p-value (F > M) = (F = M) 0.055 0.13 0.19 0.15
p-value (F > M) = (F < M) 0.0054 0.053 0.18 0.063
p-value (F = M) = (F < M) 0.55 0.83 0.91 0.83
Note: Each column provides results from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
to this section, paternity leave may impact the evolution of household roles and labor
sharing in the home. If paternity leave sets o a dynamic where the father is more in-
volved in his child and the mother becomes relatively less important, i.e. that motherly
care to some extent is replaced by fatherly care, we should expect the eect of paternity
leave to depend on parents' relative \skill levels" as parents. More specically, we may
expect to nd a positive eect on cognitive skills when care from a highly educated father
displaces that of a less educated mother.24
Table 7 reports heterogeneous eects of paternity leave according to whether the
father has higher education than the mother, the parents have equally high education, or
the mother has higher education than the father. The results are obtained by interacting
one dummy for each possibility.25 In our sample, 35.8% of students belong to the rst
24If relative education is indeed what matters, we may also expect to nd some sign of a more positive
eect for highly-educated fathers, irrespective of the mother's education. However, this approach is likely
to severely understate the potential eect of parental leave, because of the high correlation in parents'
education.
25An alternative way of addressing this question is to estimate group-specic equations, which provides
similar estimates. We prefer to interact the group indicators, as this increases precision and facilitates
22group (F>M), 27.6% to the second (F=M), and 36.6% of students belong to the third
group (F<M). Table 18 in the Appendix shows that the rst stage results are fairly
similar across the three groups - although the regression adjusted compliance rate seems
to increase with the mother being relatively higher educated.
In the families where the fathers have the highest education level we nd that pater-
nity leave increases school performance with 0.26 of a standard deviation (statistically
signicant at the 5% level). The eect is fairly stable across samples, but it is not statis-
tically signicant at conventional levels with the 7 weeks time window. The estimated
eect in families where mother's education is the longest is consistently negative, but
not statistically signicant. The last three rows of table 7 provide p-values from tests of
equality of the estimated coecients. For our most preferred specication, the hypothesis
that the eect is the same for families where the father has higher education than the
mother as for families where the mother has higher education than the father, is rejected
at the 10% level. Our results are thus similar to the ndings of Liu and Skans (2010), in
that the eect of parental leave dier by the parents' education.
Daughters and sons
Tables 8 and 9 show the results from regressions run on separate samples according to the
child's gender. We see that the eect of paternity leave on daughters' school performance
is strong - 0.38 of a standard deviation - and statistically signicant at the 5% level in
families where the father is relatively higher educated. The corresponding eect on sons'
school performance is much weaker - and not statistically signicant.
There are several potential explanations for the dierential gender eects. Dierent
uptake is not one of them: The rst stage results for the subsamples show that uptake
does not dier between the groups. Fathers of sons are just as likely to take paternity
leave as fathers of daughters.26 Therefore, either paternity leave spurs a dierent dynamic
comparison of the group-specic coecients.
26See Tables 19 and 20 in the Appendix.
23Table 8: The impact of paternity leave on daughters' school performance at age 16:
Interaction eects with parental educational groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.47*** 0.38** 0.26 0.33**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.13)
- equal educ (F = M) -0.033 -0.0012 -0.28 0.032
(0.17) (0.16) (0.23) (0.15)
- mother highest educ (F < M) -0.048 0.012 0.040 -0.0080
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.12)
Observations 13989 13989 6670 16669
R2 0.002 0.167 0.170 0.165
p-value (F > M) = (F = M) 0.034 0.080 0.094 0.13
p-value (F > M) = (F < M) 0.016 0.061 0.46 0.058
p-value (F = M) = (F < M) 0.95 0.95 0.29 0.83
Note: Each column provides results from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 9: The impact of paternity leave on sons' school performance at age 16: Interaction
eects with parental educational groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.20 0.14 0.070 0.11
(0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13)
- equal educ (F = M) 0.065 0.017 -0.043 -0.046
(0.17) (0.16) (0.25) (0.15)
- mother highest educ (F < M) -0.12 -0.025 -0.23 -0.038
(0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.11)
Observations 14808 14808 6943 17587
R2 0.006 0.171 0.167 0.171
p-value (F > M) = (F = M) 0.56 0.56 0.73 0.44
p-value (F > M) = (F < M) 0.13 0.37 0.31 0.40
p-value (F = M) = (F < M) 0.42 0.83 0.56 0.97
Note: Each column provides results from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
24Table 10: The impact of paternity leave on fathers' labor market outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Earnings, 2-5 -0.096 -0.065 -0.13** -0.074*
(0.060) (0.042) (0.063) (0.039)
Earnings, 6-9 -0.032 -0.017 -0.034 -0.018
(0.061) (0.047) (0.070) (0.043)
Full time, 2-5 -0.011 -0.020 -0.054 -0.031
(0.054) (0.053) (0.079) (0.049)
Full time, 6-9 -0.033 -0.036 -0.052 -0.045
(0.055) (0.054) (0.081) (0.050)
Part time, 2-5 -0.017 -0.027 -0.037 -0.045
(0.053) (0.053) (0.079) (0.049)
Part time, 6-9 -0.035 -0.041 -0.066 -0.049
(0.055) (0.054) (0.081) (0.050)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations varies with outcomes and window, for the baseline
window of 3-13 weeks where control variables are included (column 2) the number of observations is
27775, 27706, 27806, 27774, 27806 and 27774 for the respective outcomes.
in fathers' time use when taken with daughters as opposed to with sons, i.e. the parent's
behavioral response is dierent according to the child's gender. Or, the eect of time spent
with parents diers for boys and girls; there's a gendered dierence in the productivity of
parents' time.27
Only time use data would give a complete answer to which hypothesis is true - a
behavioral eect or a productivity eect, or a combination of the two. The results of
Morgan et al. (1988) suggest a behavioral eect, whereas Cascio (2009) and Havnes
and Mogstad (2011) are suggestive of a productivity eect. Our data on labor market
outcomes do however provide useful information on the time spent by parents doing
market work.
25Table 11: The impact of paternity leave on mothers' labor market outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Earnings, 2-5 -0.25*** -0.15*** -0.16** -0.13***
(0.061) (0.046) (0.068) (0.042)
Earnings, 6-9 -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.17** -0.12***
(0.061) (0.050) (0.075) (0.046)
Full time, 2-5 -0.060 -0.014 0.0014 -0.0069
(0.055) (0.050) (0.074) (0.046)
Full time, 6-9 -0.077 -0.041 0.0046 -0.011
(0.055) (0.052) (0.078) (0.048)
Part time, 2-5 -0.12** -0.087* -0.14* -0.079*
(0.053) (0.050) (0.075) (0.046)
Part time, 6-9 -0.15*** -0.12** -0.15** -0.091*
(0.054) (0.052) (0.077) (0.047)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations varies with outcomes and window, for the baseline
window of 3-13 weeks where control variables are included (column 2) the number of observations is
28307, 28271, 28320, 28289, 28320 and 28289 for the respective outcomes.
5.2 Labor market outcomes
Table 10 shows the results from regressions on equation (1), where the dependent variables
are the normalized averages of earnings and labor supply for fathers over the years when
the child is 2-5 years old and 6-9 years old, respectively.
Our estimated eects of paternity leave on fathers' labor market outcomes are negative
for every outcome and across all time windows. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that paternity leave increases fathers' involvement at home, but the estimates are (with
a few exceptions) not statistically signicant. The point estimates we document are
however in line with the ones found by Rege and Solli (2010), indicating that the lack
of any statistical signicant eects in our analysis may be due to low statistical power.
The identication strategy of Rege and Solli (2010) is based on the assumption that time
trends in the earnings of fathers of children of dierent ages through the 1990s would be
equal in the absence of the reform.
27We are thankful to Shelly Lundberg for pointing out this distinction to us.
26Table 11 shows the corresponding results on mothers' labor market outcomes. Con-
trary to what would be expected in a simple Beckerian framework, mothers' earnings are
negatively aected by paternity leave, both in the short run (child age 2-5) and in the
long run (child age 6-9). In the baseline window, the eect is 0.15 of a standard deviation
reduction in earnings, statistically signicant at the one percent level. Point estimates
and precision are fairly stable across time windows.
The estimated average reduction in earnings seems to be driven by a negative eect of
paternity leave on mothers' working hours, more specically the probability that mothers
work part time or more. Though less precise, the estimated eects on work hours are
comparable in size to the eects on earnings.
Our results on working hours, thus, provide no support for the hypothesis that pa-
ternity leave will cause households to specialize less in line with traditional gender roles:
It seems, rather, that traditional household specialization is intensied. Furthermore,
the conjecture that paternity leave causes general earning dierentials between men and
women to decrease is not substantiated empirically.
The adverse eects of paternity leave on women's labor market outcomes may be due
to complementarities in mothers' and fathers' time. If fathers choose to spend more time
at home and less in the market due to a family policy that strengthens the ties between
fathers and children, so do mothers.
Daughters and sons
The results on children's school performance showed that paternity leave increased the
importance of fathers' education for the school performance of daughters. In Table 12
we report the eects on parents' labor market outcomes in separate samples for families
who had daughters and families who had sons. Again, the eects are much stronger in
families who had daughters. For fathers' labor market outcomes, the point estimates are
even positive (but far from statistically signicant at conventional levels) in families who
had boys. The results on mothers' labor market outcomes reported above, are driven by
27Table 12: The impact of paternity leave on parents' labor market outcomes by child's
gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fathers of girls Fathers of boys Mothers of girls Mothers of boys
Earnings, 2-5 -0.088 -0.033 -0.26*** -0.057
(0.062) (0.057) (0.066) (0.063)
Earnings, 6-9 -0.047 0.015 -0.25*** -0.032
(0.069) (0.064) (0.072) (0.069)
Full time, 2-5 -0.093 0.050 -0.046 0.017
(0.077) (0.073) (0.072) (0.069)
Full time, 6-9 -0.13 0.051 -0.086 -0.00077
(0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072)
Part time, 2-5 -0.11 0.053 -0.13* -0.046
(0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.069)
Part time, 6-9 -0.11 0.029 -0.21*** -0.048
(0.078) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
the sample of families who had girls.
Our results are indicative of a gender dierence in parents' behavioral response to pa-
ternity leave, which again may contribute to the eect on daughters' school performance
in families where fathers are relatively higher educated than mothers. As gender is unre-
lated to unobserved pre-birth characteristics, it is unlikely that the estimated dierences
re
ect dierences in unobservables.
5.3 Family outcomes
Our analysis is completed by looking at how paternity leave aects a set of outcomes
more directly connected to family life. In light of the somewhat surprising results found
on labor market outcomes, family outcomes may be informative. For instance, if parents'
time investment in family life are complementarities, this could show up in fertility and
divorce rates.
Table 13 provides our results on family outcomes. In the baseline specication none of
28Table 13: The impact of paternity leave on family outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Mother's parity -0.028 -0.020 0.059 -0.054
(0.054) (0.044) (0.066) (0.040)
Father's parity -0.032 -0.031 0.028 -0.052
(0.060) (0.046) (0.069) (0.042)
Divorce by child age 14 0.0082 0.0072 0.011 0.033
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.049)
Next child together -0.024 -0.028 -0.025 -0.044*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.039) (0.025)
Child spacing 15.3 29.6 44.2 54.0
(57.2) (55.0) (79.3) (50.1)
Father's leave next child 0.37 0.48 1.66 1.04
(2.35) (2.32) (3.27) (2.09)
Index of outcomes -0.058 -0.053 -0.0013 -0.080**
(0.048) (0.040) (0.059) (0.037)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations varies with outcomes and window, for the baseline
window of 3-13 weeks where control variables are included (column 2) the number of observations is
27790, 27790, 4339, 16652, 14541, 9231 and 27790 for the respective outcomes.
29these are statistically signicant. The lack of eects on family outcomes aects the scope
for potential mechanisms through which paternity leave in
uences other outcomes. For
example, the negative eects on mothers' earnings and employment could have followed
from an increase in subsequent fertility. Our results indicate that this is not the case.
As referred in Lundberg and Rose (2004), several authors have reported that, in the
United States, having a son relative to a daughter increases the likelihood that a marriage
will remain intact. In light of this, it may be that our nding no average eects may
conceal heterogeneous eects according to gender. Indeed, it turns out that the point
estimates consistently have opposite signs in the two samples, although the dierences
are mostly statistically insignicant.28
5.4 Characterizing compliers
Since any instrumental variable strategy identies eects only for the subpopulation af-
fected by the instrument, external validity is always a concern (Mott (2005)). It is
therefore useful to characterize families whose behavior was actually aected by the pa-
ternal quota reform - `compliers' in the terminology of Imbens and Angrist (1994). If the
compliant subpopulation is similar to the general population, the case for extrapolating
estimated causal eects to the general population is stronger.
Table 14 presents the likelihood that a complier has a particular characteristic relative
to the population of eligible families. This is obtained by taking the ratio of the rst stage
across a particular covariate group to the overall rst-stage (Angrist and Pischke (2009),
Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010)).29
Fathers in the compliant subpopulation have somewhat higher education and age than
the average for fathers in our sample of eligible families. When it comes to income and
work experience, there are slightly fewer compliant fathers in both the lowest and highest
28The results can be seen in Table 21 in the Appendix.
29We report results for all covariates we use in our regression analysis. While 'annual income' and
'years of employment' enters linearly in our regression analysis, we have split them in quartiles for the
purpose of characterizing the complier group.
30Table 14: Complier characteristics ratios
Father's Mother's
Lower sec. or less 0.895 0.798
Upper secondary 0.996 1.012
Higher ed.. lower level 1.157 1.188
Higher ed.. higher level 1.063 1.243
Age 20-24 0.714 0.793
Age 25-29 1.015 1.018
Age 30-34 1.033 1.031
Age 35-44 0.984 1.064
Income quartile 1 0.805 0.688
Income quartile 2 1.13 0.888
Income quartile 3 1.115 1.143
Income quartile 4 0.963 1.245
Experience quartile 1 0.949 0.949
Experience quartile 2 1.102 0.964
Experience quartile 3 1.003 1.053
Experience quartile 4 0.951 1.04
Note: Each cell represents the ratio between the rst stage estimate for the particular covariate group
relative to the overall rst stage. The ratios can be interpreted as the likelihood that the compliant
subpopulation has a certain feature relative to the likelihood of that same feature among all eligible
families. The sample is parents of children born in the 26 week period surrounding April 1, 1993 (minus
the four weeks immediately around April 1), who were eligible for parental leave.
quartiles. Overall, fathers' characteristics in the compliant subpopulation are not very
dierent from eligible families in general. For mothers' characteristics, the dierences are
larger: Compliant mothers have less than half the propensity to belong to the lowest in-
come quartile in our sample of eligible families. They are also more highly educated. The
dierence regarding mothers' income between the compliant subpopulation and eligible
families in general should be kept in mind when interpreting the eects reported above.
6 Conclusion
The proponents of paternity leave list a number of ways in which it will benet fathers,
children - and mothers. In this paper we look at the empirical basis for their claims.
We nd no evidence of an eect of paternity leave on children's school performance on
average. We do however nd that the eect depends on the parents' relative education;
31where children of fathers with higher education than the mother benet from paternity
leave. This is an indication that paternity leave causes a shift from motherly to fatherly
care at home.
This shift is not mirrored in the parents' labor market outcomes, however. That
mothers seem to respond to paternity leave by reducing labor supply is at odds with
the standard economic framework emphasizing specialization in household vs. market
work. Our analysis suggests that family-oriented policies, even if directed towards fathers,
may be ill suited to reducing earnings dierentials between men and women. Further
investigation into the mechanisms behind the negative eects on mothers' earnings and
labor supply is needed. One possible explanation is that mothers' and fathers' time at
home are complements.
This paper also shows that family policies may work dierently according to the child's
gender, because parents respond dierently to the policy depending on whether they have
a son or a daughter. We have shown that the dierence is not in terms of compliance
with the policy, but rather that it lies in how the policy makes parents behave. This
nding needs to be further investigated.
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357 Appendix
Table 15: Parental leave reforms in Norway
Date Total parental leave Compensation rate Paternal quota
1.7.1977 18 weeks 100% -
1.5.1987 20 weeks 100% -
1.7.1988 22 weeks 100% -
1.4.1989 24(30) weeks 100(80)% -
1.5.1990 28(35) weeks 100(80)% -
1.7.1991 32(40) weeks 100(80)% -
1.4.1992 35(44.4) weeks 100(80)% -
1.4.1993 42(52) weeks 100(80)% 4 weeks
1.7.2005 43(53) weeks 100(80)% 5 weeks
1.7.2006 44(54) weeks 100(80)% 6 weeks
1.7.2009 46(56) weeks 100(80)% 10 weeks
1.7.2011 47(57) weeks 100(80)% 12 weeks
Source: http://www.nav.no/rettskildene/Rundskriv/183541.cms.
36Table 16: Descriptive statistics for cohorts born before and after April 1, 1992
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-reform Post-reform Dierence
Mean SD Mean SD Estimate SE
Fathers
- % take leave 2.84 (16.6) 3.47 (18.3) 0.63** (0.28)
- no. leave days 1.42 (9.99) 2.08 (13.5) 0.65*** (0.19)
- % age < 25 4.88 (21.6) 4.92 (21.6) 0.035 (0.35)
- % age 25-29 28.9 (45.3) 28.7 (45.2) -0.23 (0.74)
- % age 30-34 36.1 (48.0) 37.2 (48.3) 1.03 (0.78)
- % age > 34 30.1 (45.9) 29.2 (45.5) -0.84 (0.74)
- % lower sec. or less 37.8 (48.5) 36.9 (48.3) -0.88 (0.79)
- % upper secondary 33.1 (47.1) 34.3 (47.5) 1.21 (0.77)
- % higher ed.  4 yrs 20 (40.0) 19.7 (39.8) -0.28 (0.65)
- % higher ed. > 4 yrs 9.10 (28.8) 9.05 (28.7) -0.046 (0.47)
- annual income 253.4 (97.4) 254.7 (95.9) 1.31 (1.57)
- % has no children 42.0 (49.4) 39.7 (48.9) -2.33*** (0.80)
- % has one child 37.2 (48.3) 38.9 (48.8) 1.71** (0.79)
- % has two children 15.6 (36.2) 15.9 (36.6) 0.36 (0.59)
- % has  three children 5.20 (22.2) 5.47 (22.7) 0.26 (0.37)
Mothers
- % take leave 90.2 (29.7) 88.7 (31.6) -1.49*** (0.50)
- no. leave days 159.0 (60.2) 173.4 (70.5) 14.4*** (1.07)
- % age < 25 13.3 (34.0) 13.6 (34.3) 0.29 (0.55)
- % age 25-29 40.4 (49.1) 40.1 (49.0) -0.29 (0.80)
- % age 30-34 31.8 (46.6) 32.8 (46.9) 0.99 (0.76)
- % age > 34 14.6 (35.3) 13.6 (34.2) -0.99* (0.56)
- % lower sec. or less 39.4 (48.9) 38.5 (48.7) -0.87 (0.79)
- % upper secondary 29.0 (45.4) 29.4 (45.6) 0.44 (0.74)
- % higher ed.  4 yrs 28.0 (44.9) 27.7 (44.8) -0.29 (0.73)
- % higher ed. > 4 yrs 3.56 (18.5) 4.28 (20.2) 0.72** (0.32)
- annual income 174.2 (57.2) 175.7 (58.3) 1.41 (0.94)
- % has no children 44.2 (49.7) 42.0 (49.4) -2.24*** (0.80)
- % has one child 38.0 (48.5) 39.5 (48.9) 1.54* (0.79)
- % has two children 14.3 (35.0) 15.1 (35.8) 0.74 (0.58)
- % has  three children 3.44 (18.2) 3.40 (18.1) -0.038 (0.30)
N 7495 7666 15161
Note: All observations except those regarding parental leave are taken from the year before the child's
birth. Age categories are based on parents' age at birth of the rst child. Sample is children born during
the 26 weeks surrounding April 1, 1992, excluding two weeks before and after April 1, divided into those
born during the 13 weeks preceding the reform and those born during the rst 13 weeks after the reform.
37Table 17: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.010) (0.0064)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an OLS regressions on equation 2. A year dummy and
calender week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set
of socio-economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
< 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 18: First stage results by parental education.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.34***
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0059)
- equal educ (F = M) 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.010) (0.0063)
- mother highest educ (F < M) 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.38***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.010) (0.0064)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an OLS regressions on equation 2. A year dummy and
calender week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set
of socio-economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
< 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 19: First stage results by parental education - daughters.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.34***
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.013) (0.0084)
- equal educ (F = M) 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.0093)
- mother highest educ (F < M) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37***
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.014) (0.0091)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an OLS regressions on equation 2. A year dummy and
calender week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set
of socio-economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
< 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
38Table 20: First stage results by parental education - sons.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-13  Weeks 3-7  Weeks 1-13
Father takes leave
- father highest educ (F > M) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.35***
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.013) (0.0083)
- equal educ (F = M) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.014) (0.0087)
- mother highest educ (F < M) 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.014) (0.0089)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an OLS regressions on equation 2. A year dummy and
calender week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set
of socio-economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
< 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 21: The impact of paternity leave on family outcomes by child's gender
(1) (2)
Families who had girls Families who had boys
Mother's parity 0.032 -0.069
(0.063) (0.061)
Father's parity 0.023 -0.080
(0.066) (0.063)
Divorce by child age 14 0.13 -0.087
(0.10) (0.088)
Next child together -0.081** 0.016
(0.041) (0.036)
Child spacing 91.9 -23.5
(81.6) (74.0)
Father's leave next child 5.78* -3.59
(3.25) (3.26)
Index of outcomes -0.071 -0.039
(0.058) (0.056)
Note: Each cell represents coecients from an IV regression on equation 1. A year dummy and calender
week xed eects are included in all specications. Included in specications (2)-(4) are a set of socio-
economic background characteristics explained in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,**
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations varies with outcomes and window, for the baseline
window of 3-13 weeks where control variables are included (column 2) the number of observations is
27790, 27790, 4339, 16652, 14541, 9231 and 27790 for the respective outcomes.
39